We analyze the limit behavior of sequences of oligopolistic equilibria in which firms follow objectives consistent with their shareholders' interests. We show that convergence to a competitive outcome may fail for some distributions of firms' shares across consumers, and provide a characterization of the class of ownership structures that lead to Walrasian equilibrium allocations in the limit.
Introduction
Perfectly competitive (or price taking) behavior is believed to arise -and is generally justified in the literature -when the number of economic agents that interact in the market is large, and each agent is small relative to the whole economy. There are, however, examples that show how monopoly profits and inefficient allocations can persist in equilibrium, even with an arbitrarily large number of small, competing agents. In an environment without uncertainty (or with uncertainty but a complete set of contingent securities) this happens if, as the economy grows larger, the sequence of its (oligopolistic) equilibria approaches a critical equilibrium point of the limit economy (?). The results of this paper uncover yet another possible source of inefficiency in large economies: the firms' ownership structures. If firms pursue their shareholders' interests, the way shares are allocated across consumers plays an important role in achieving competitive behavior in the limit.
For a firm that has market power, the choice of a production plan affects shareholders' real wealth in two ways: through the profits it generates (we will call this the income effect), and through the change in market prices it induces (we call this the price effect). It is well-known that these can be opposite effects (see, for example, ?, ?, ?) and thus the production plan that maximizes firm's profit, under some price normalization, 1 may not maximize the welfare of firm's shareholders.
One would expect a firm's production choice to be consistent with its shareholders' interests but, typically, no production plan will be unanimously supported by all shareholders. We say that a production plan chosen by a firm is compatible with its shareholders' interests (given the production plans chosen by the other firms) if no other production plan makes all shareholders better off (provided that the other firms do not change their plans). Such a production plan is therefore efficient (or Pareto undominated) from the point of view of the firm's shareholders and will be called -efficient (with standing for "shareholders"). We are interested in the strategic interaction of a large number of firms whose objective is compatible with their shareholders' interests, in the sense of selecting -efficient production plans. The Cournot-Nash equilibria of such game played by the firms must then have the property that every firm's equilibrium production plan is -efficient given the production plans of the others. We call such equilibrium a Cournot -equilibrium. Although we assume, for simplicity, that the interests of all shareholders govern the decisions of a firm, our results also hold under the weaker assumption that a firm's objective is shaped by the interests of a smaller "control group" such as the Board of Directors.
We study the limit behavior of Cournot -equilibrium production plans of a sequence of private ownership economies and show that, depending on the ownership structure, the equilibria may or may not approach a Walrasian equilibrium of the limit economy. Convergence to a Walrasian equilibrium obtains if the fraction of each firm owned by its (controlling) shareholders is bounded away from zero. The result is fairly intuitive. In economies with many competing firms, the price effect of each firm's action on its shareholders' welfare becomes almost negligible. However, if the ownership of a given firm is dispersed among a large number of shareholders, so that each of them holds only a tiny fraction of the firm, the income effect of that firm's choices on their wealth must be negligible as well. Thus the price effect, albeit becoming negligible itself, may still dominate the income effect. As a result, shareholders may disapprove the maximization of profits in arbitrarily large economies. Our results suggest that, while perfect portfolio diversification might be optimal from an investor's point of view (as suggested by CAPM-style models) it may not lead to efficiency economy-wide when firms pursue their shareholders' interests.
One of the major difficulties in studying the limit behavior of a sequence of Cournot -equilibria is defining a notion of "closeness" on the space of private ownership production economies. For the case of pure-exchange, representing an economy as a distribution on the space of agents' characteristics (?, ?) enables the use of weak convergence of measures to define a topology on the space of economies. For a production economy, the space of characteristics must be enlarged to include firms' production sets and ownership structure. However, as opposed to preferences, endowments or production sets, an ownership structure is intrinsically related to a space of consumers and a space of firms, and it is not obvious how such ownership structure can be included in a space of characteristics that is agent-independent. Even when restricting attention to economies with a finite number of types of consumers and firms, the separation of ownership from the actual names of consumers and firms is difficult, unless one is willing to make very restrictive symmetry assumptions on the ownership structure. A familiar example of such symmetry requirement is that every consumer of type owns equal shares in all the firms of type (?, ?). As some of our results show, focusing on such specific ownership structure, one is bound to miss important insights that are revealed only in economies with more general ownership structures.
We construct here a general framework that embeds any private ownership production economy and allows for a natural topological structure, which generalizes other topologies defined in the literature, over more restrictive spaces of economies. We also show that a continuum production economy is a good approximation for a large finite economy, since it can be written as the limit of finite economies.
? proves, in related work, that if a firm maximizes profits (under a specific price normalization), then each shareholder's gain from switching to his most preferred production plan diminishes as the economy grows larger. Thus, Hart's result implies that profit maximization by oligopolistic firms is approximately in the best interest of each firm's shareholder if the economy is large enough. His proof depends crucially on the "assumption that all consumers are typical", which is a condition imposed on the controlling agents' (endogenous) wealth. We show that this condition is extremely restrictive, holding only under special circumstances, and proceed by giving a proof of the main result in ? which dispenses entirely with the assumption that consumers are typical, without adding any other assumptions (Lemma 5.1). Then we use this fact to show that Cournot -efficient equilibria are approximately profit maximizing in large economies (Theorem 5.6), and to give conditions under which the limit of a sequence of converging Cournot -efficient equilibria in converging economies is a Walrasian equilibrium of the limit economy (Theorems 5.6, 5.7).
The paper is organized as follows. We start, in section 2, by giving an example that illustrates the main points of the paper. In section 3 we set up a general framework for describing private ownership production economies and show how the standard Arrow-Debreu economies and their replicas can be embedded in this framework. The Cournot -equilibrium concept and some of its properties in continuum economies are described in section 4. Section 5 defines a topology on the space of private ownership economies and provides conditions on the ownership structure such that approximate and exact convergence of Cournot -efficient equilibria to a Walrasian equilibrium obtains. Section 6 concludes.
An illustrative example
Let ℰ 1 be an Arrow-Debreu economy with two goods, two consumers and one firm. Consumers have identical preferences over consumption of the two goods, represented by the utility : ℝ 2 + → ℝ, ( 1 , 2 ) = ln 1 + ln 2 . The endowment of goods of consumer 1, respectively 2, are 1 = (4, 4), respectively 2 = (4, 2). The first consumer is the sole owner of the firm, whose production set is := {(− , ) | ∈ [0, 1]}. We will refer to the economy ℰ 1 as the prototype economy.
It is assumed throughout that consumers are price takers in all markets while every firm behaves strategically, internalizing the effect of its choices of production plans on the market prices. Unlike the standard Cournot-Walras model (?), firms do not maximize profits, but rather choose production plans that are non-dominated from the point of view of their shareholders, taking as given the choices of other firms, but internalizing the effect of its own choice on the equilibrium market prices. We call such equilibria Cournot -efficient equilibria (or simply Cournot -equilibria). The term hints to the fact that such a production plan is efficient from the point of view of the shareholders who, while price takers as consumers, are aware of the market power of the firms they own. Cournot -efficient equilibria are typically different from the standard Cournot-Walras equilibria due to price effects on shareholders' wealth.
Without loss of generality, we normalize prices to lie in the unit simplex.
2
Given a choice of a production plan (− , ), in the resulting competitive exchange equilibrium, (normalized) prices are ( 6+ 14 ,
8− 14
)
, and first consumer's utility is ( ) = 2 ln(28 + (1 − )) − ln(6 + ) − ln(8 − ). As the sole owner of the firm, consumer 1 would want the firm to choose a production plan (− * , * ) with * ∈ [0, 1] that maximizes his utility (which is strictly concave in ). The first order conditions show that * is the unique solution of the equation 3 − 3 2 − 67 + 20 = 0 that belongs to [0, 1] , that is * ≈ 0.3. Hence, the unique equilibrium of the prototype economy in which the firm acts strategically in the market but follows an objective that is consistent with its owner's interests corresponds to a production vector (− * , * ) ≈ (−0.3, 0.3) and the equilibrium prices (
≈ (0.45, 0.55). To study the limit behavior of Cournot -equilibria we construct sequences of replica economies, in the spirit of ?. An -fold replica of ℰ 1 , denoted ℰ , is an economy with 2 consumers and firms. All firms, indexed by ∈ {1, ..., }, have the same production set as the firm of the prototype economy. Consumers are indexed by ( , ) with ∈ {1, 2} and ∈ {1, .., }. We will refer to as the type and to as the name of the consumer ( , ). Every consumer of type has the same preferences and endowment of goods as consumer of the prototype economy. Similarly, a continuum replica (also called the limit replica) ℰ ∞ , is an economy with a continuum of identical firms and consumers of each type.
Due to log-utilities, the exchange equilibrium prices following a choice of production plans by the firms in any of these replicas do not depend on the way shares are distributed across consumers. For the -fold replica economy, given a production plan = ((− , )) =1 , let
Simple computations reveal that the unique exchange equilibrium price vector following the choice of production plan depends only on the average production and it is equal to (
. The same formula is valid in the continuum replica economy ℰ ∞ , with a proper reinterpretation of , that is,
where is the Lebesgue measure on [0, 1]. For a continuum replica, a feasible production plan is a Lebesque measurable function : [0, 1] → . Cournot -equilibrium production plans of the -fold replica economy depend on the ownership structure, which is the deciding factor in whether Cournot -equilibria of large economies become close to Walrasian equilibria of the limit economy ℰ ∞ . There are various ways to replicate the ownership of firms' shares. We will outline here two different types of ownership structures, and show that they bear very different implications on the issue whether Cournot -equilibrium allocations approach the competitive allocations of the limit economy.
1. Concentrated ownership replication. In this replication, every consumer of type 1 is the sole owner of the firm with the same name (i.e., consumer (1, ) is the sole owner of firm ), and all consumers of type 2 have no firm ownership. We denote (finite and continuum) replicas bearing this ownership structure by ℰ and ℰ ∞ .
Following a choice = ((− , )) =1 ∈ ℝ 2 of production plans by the firms, the wealth and utility of consumer (1, ) in such replica are given by:
Thus, in accordance with its owner's preferences, each firm chooses ∈ [0, 1] to maximize ( , ). Since the problem has a unique solution, Cournot -equilibria of the economy ℰ must be symmetric, i.e., = for = 1, .., . The first order condition implies that satisfies
According to the implicit function theorem, the solution of (2.5), denoted (1/ ), is a continuous function of 1/ , hence when → ∞, (1/ ) converges to the solution of (2 − 2)/( 2 − − 28) = 0, which is * = 1. This corresponds to every firm choosing the competitive production plan. Thus, the sequence of Cournot -efficient equilibria of ℰ converges to the Walrasian equilibrium of ℰ ∞ .
2. Diffuse ownership replication. In this replication, every firm is equally owned by all consumers of type 1, while consumers of type 2 still have no ownership. The finite -fold replica will be denoted by ℰ , while the continuum replica will be denoted by ℰ ∞ .
Since each firm in ℰ is owned by identical consumers, at a Cournotequilibrium, firms maximize the utility of their representative owner. The wealth and utility of consumer (1, ) in ℰ depend only on the average production, ( ), and have the same expressions as (2.3),(2.4) with replaced by ( ). Thus owners of each firm are identical in terms of preferences and wealth, and therefore finding -efficient allocations amounts to maximizing the utility of the representative consumer, which reduces to the case analyzed for the prototype economy. Hence a production plan is a Cournot -equilibrium plan if and only if it satisfies ( ) = * ≈ 0.3. In particular, the production plan * in which all firms choose (− * , * ) is a Cournot -equilibrium. Hence, the monopolistic choice persists in arbitrarily large economies.
Note that every consumer of type 1 has the same total ownership of shares in the two examples. In the concentrated ownership example, each consumer remains the sole owner of a firm, irrespective of the size of the economy. Thus, even as the economy grows larger, that firm's production choice significantly affects its owner's budget constraint and thus the income effect of a firm's production choice remains significant in arbitrarily large economies. On the other hand, the price effects vanish and are dominated by the income effect in sufficiently large economies. Thus, every type 1 consumer would want his firm to choose a production plan close to the profit maximizing plan at the limit competitive price. By contrast, in the diffuse ownership example, a type 1 consumer's ownership in any firm diminishes as the economy grows larger. Thus, the income effect of a firm's choice vanishes as well and never dominates the price effect. This is the mechanism through which a monopolistic equilibrium can persist in arbitrarily large economies.
The two examples illustrate that what drives the competitive behavior is not only a vanishing price effect, but also the relationship between the price and the income effect. In large economies the price effect of a change in production by a firm becomes negligible. If, at the same time, the income effect becomes negligible (as it happens with the diffuse ownership), then the price effect may still dominate the income effect and non-competitive outcomes can persist in arbitrarily large (and even the atomless limit) economies . If both the income and the price effects vanish, shareholders become indifferent among their firm's choices in the limit. However, as our example shows, shareholders are not indifferent among firm's choices along the sequence.
It should also be noted that the relevance of ownership structure in this framework is driven solely by firms' behavior, through their choice of production plans in accordance with their shareholders' interests. Whether a firm's shareholders' interests are aligned (as in this example) or not (as in the main results and the examples contained in section 5) is inconsequential.
3 Finite-type production economies Let ℐ := {1, ..., } be the set of consumers' types and := {1, ..., } be the set of firms' types, where , are positive integers. For every ∈ let ⊆ ℝ be the production set of a type-firm.
is assumed to satisfy the following standard conditions: (a) is closed, convex and contains the origin and (b)
excludes "free lunches"). For every ∈ ℐ, let (ℝ + , , ) be the characteristics of a type consumer, where ℝ + is the consumption set, : ℝ + → ℝ a utility representation of his preferences, and ∈ ℝ ++ the endowment of goods. It is assumed that the utility functions are continuous, monotonic and strictly quasi-concave.
The space of firms is (Ω , ), where Ω := × [0, 1] and is a finite or countably generated -algebra on Ω such that 2 × [0, 1] ⊂ ; thus the projection of Ω on , defined as (( , )) = , for all ( , ) ∈ Ω , is measurable. A firm is an atom of the -algebra .
3 For every ∈ Ω , the unique atom that contains is denoted by ( ), and is called firm ( ), or simply firm , when no confusion can arise.
4 Since 2 × [0, 1] ⊆ , every atom's projection on must be a singleton, and therefore any firm ( ) can be written as a pair ( , ) for some ∈ and ⊂ [0, 1]. We will refer to = ( ) as the type of firm .
The consumers' side of the economy is represented by the probability space (Ω , ℱ, ), where Ω := ℐ × [0, 1], ℱ is a -algebra on Ω such that (Ω , ℱ) is a Polish space, 5 and is a probability measure on ℱ. We assume that 2 ℐ × [0, 1] ⊂ ℱ, hence the projection function of Ω on ℐ is measurable. A consumer is an atom of the -algebra ℱ. For every ∈ Ω , the unique atom that contains will be denoted by ℱ( ) and referred to as consumer ℱ( ), or simply as consumer . 6 The type of consumer ℱ( ) is ( ) ∈ ℐ. The relative size of type-consumers to the size of the economy is ({ } × [0, 1]). The ownership structure of the economy is described by a measure kernel : Ω × → ℝ + . Thus, for all ∈ Ω , ( , ⋅) is a finite measure on (interpreted as consumer 's allocation of shares across firms) and, for every 3 A non-empty set is called an atom of the -algebra if and only if ∈ and for all ∈ , either ⊆ or ∩ = ∅ (?, p.87). 4 Since is countably generated, the atoms of form a partition of Ω , and the atom ( ) equals the intersection of all sets in containing (see Appendix A for details).
5 The space (Ω , ℱ ) is Polish if ℱ is the Borel -algebra generated by a topology on Ω induced by a complete and separable metric.
6 The Polish space assumption imposed on (Ω , ℱ ) implies that ℱ is countably generated, and hence the results of Appendix A apply. See also footnote 4. ∈ , the map (⋅, ) is ℱ-measurable. For every ∈ Ω , ( , Ω ) represents the total "number" of shares (in various firms) owned by consumer . We assume that (⋅, Ω ) is bounded. Note that this definition allows consumers of the same type to have different endowments of shares. Therefore, consumers of the same type are identical only in terms of their preferences and endowments of goods.
Let ⊗ be the measure on the product -algebra ℱ ⊗ defined by 
Notice that (⋅) = ( ⊗ )(Ω × ⋅) and thus is also a finite measure. We consider only economies with (Ω ) > 0, otherwise only a -measure zero of consumers own shares and firms' choices become inconsequential and cannot affect the economy. Hence, there exists a probability kernel
is a probability measure on ℱ, (ii) for every ∈ ℱ, (⋅, ) is -measurable, and (iii) for any : Ω × Ω → ℝ which is ℱ ⊗ -measurable and ( ⊗ )-integrable,
Moreover, is unique -a.s., in the sense that if ′ has the above properties, then for -a.e. ∈ Ω , ( , ⋅) = ′ ( , ⋅). 9 For every ∈ Ω , the probability ( , ⋅) represents firm 's distribution of shares across consumers.
The probability space of consumers (Ω , ℱ, ), together with the measurable space of firms (Ω , ) and an ownership structure described by the kernel from Ω to Ω defines a private ownership production economy ℰ,
A finite economy is an economy for which the -algebras ℱ and are finite. An atomless economy is an economy for which the measure is atomless.
8 See the Appendix B for a proof. 9 Throughout the paper, "a.e." means "almost every(where)" and "a.s." means "almost surely".
10 The measure on (Ω , ) is atomless, or nonatomic, if has no -nonnull atoms (?, p.82).
Equation (3.2) implies that
is atomless if and only if for every ∈ Ω , ( , ( )) = 0 for -a.e. ∈ Ω . This definition focuses on the atomicity of firms, rather than consumers. The economy ℰ can be atomless even if has atoms. This happens if for any atom ℱ( ) of , ( , ⋅) is an atomless measure. Conversely, can be atomless without being so. Indeed, a firm is an atom if ( , ( )) > 0 for a positive -measure set of consumers . The prototypical Arrow-Debreu production economy with consumers and firms, in which the -th consumer owns ( , ) shares of -th firm can be represented as an economy
is equal to ℐ ⊗ , the product measure between ℐ , the uniform probability on ℐ (that is ℐ ( ) = 1/ , ∀ ∈ ℐ) and , the Lebesque measure on [0, 1]. Thus we identify the -th consumer, respectively the -th firm of the Arrow-Debreu economy with the atom (
Using sequences of replica economies to draw inferences about (strategic) equilibrium behavior in large economies is a technique introduced by ?, for pure exchange economies, and also widely used in the literature for economies with production. An -fold replica consists of "clones" of each firm and each consumer of the prototype Arrow-Debreu economy. There are many ways to assign ownership of firms across consumers in replica economies. For example, a replica may be constructed such that each clone of a certain type holds the same number of shares in firms of the same industry (type); in the example of Section 2 we referred to this ownership structure as a "diffuse ownership" replication. This approach is advocated by ?, ?, ?, and ?, among others. However this is not the only way one can construct replicas of a particular economy, even when similarity of the clones is a concern. ?, ? and ? assume that each clone of the prototype economy inherits the initial ownership structure. In this "concentrated ownership" replication (see Section 2), a clone of a consumer of type owns ( , ) shares of the corresponding clone of firm . The name captures the idea that ownership is segmented across the clones of the prototype economy, rather than being spread across multiple clones. We illustrate here how the concentrated and diffuse ownerships described above can be embedded in our framework. Section 5 contains an example of a different ownership structure and replication technique. However, our main results (of Sections 4 and 5) apply to general ownership structures and do not rely on the idea of replication.
For every ∈ ℕ, let 1 := [0, 1/ ] and for ∈ {2, 3, . . . , }, let :
. Denote by ℋ the algebra generated by
= 2 ⊗ ℋ and := ℐ ⊗ . Thus consumers and firms in the -fold replica are pairs of the form ( , ) and, respectively, ( , ), with = 1, ..., . By an abuse of notation we will often identify a point ∈ [0, 1] with the interval ℋ ( ) and thus represent consumers and firms as pairs ( , ) and respectively ( , ). We will refer to the first component of such pair as the "type" and to the second as the "name" of the consumer/firm.
The concentrated ownership -fold replica can be modeled as an economy
where The diffuse ownership -fold replica can be described as the economy
Note that for every consumer ( , ), the total number of shares owned by ( , ) is the same in the concentrated ownership and diffuse replica economies ℰ , ℰ . Thus, the total mass of the ownership distribution of a consumer stays the same. However, under the diffuse ownership specification, the support of the distribution becomes larger as the size of the economy increases.
Intuitively, the sequence of economies (ℰ ) "converges" to the atomless economy
Similarly, the sequence of economies (ℰ ) "converges" to the atomless economy
We formalize the notion of convergence for arbitrary (i.e., not necessarily replica-type) sequences of finite economies in Section 5.
Cournot -equilibrium
This section defines our notion of equilibrium for production economies in which consumers are price takers when making their consumption decisions, and firms interact strategically via a Cournot-type quantity competition but, rather than maximizing profits, they follow an objective that is consistent with their shareholders' interests. We call this new concept a Cournot -equilibrium.
To simplify exposition, we make no distinction here between the consumers who own the firm and those who control it. However all our results remain true if we assume that a firm's decisions are controlled by a (predetermined) group of consumers (e.g., the Board of Directors).
Consider a production economy ℰ = ((Ω , ℱ, ); (Ω , ); ). An allocation for the economy ℰ is a pair ( , ), such that : Ω → ℝ + is ℱ-measurable, : Ω → ℝ is -measurable and ( , ⋅)-integrable for -almost all ∈ Ω , and ( , ) ∈ for all ( , ) ∈ Ω . Hence for any ∈ Ω and ∈ Ω , ( ) represents the consumption bundle of agent , and ( ) is the production per outstanding share of firm . We call a consumption allocation and a production plan for the economy ℰ. The allocation ( , ) is called feasible if
where ( ) := ( ) , ∈ Ω and = . A given production plan generates the intermediate endowment mapping
: Ω → ℝ defined by
Note that (3.3) implies that is -integrable and
When the market price vector is ∈ Δ −1 (with Δ −1 denoting the unit simplex in ℝ + ), the budget constraint of a consumer ∈ Ω is { ∈ ℝ + | ⋅ ≤ ⋅ ( )} and his consumption choice is ( ) ( , ( )), where
The utility of consumer at his optimal consumption choice, when faced with prices and a production plan , is ( ) ( , ( )), where ( , ) := ( ( , ) ) , for every ∈ ℐ, ∈ Δ −1 , ∈ ℝ + . For any production plan , denote by ℰ( ) the associated pure-exchange economy in which consumers' endowments are given by . The set of Walrasian equilibrium prices of the economy ℰ( ) depends only on the distribution of intermediate endowments across types defined as ∘˜ −1 , where˜ : Ω → ℐ×
be the set of Walrasian equilibrium price vectors of ℰ( ). For brevity, we set ( ) := ( ∘˜ −1 ). For some production sets, in particular for those that exhibit free disposal, the economy ℰ may have no Walrasian equilibrium. Certain lower bounds, or capacity constraints, need to be imposed on the firms' strategy sets to avoid this occurrence and make the problem meaningful. It is sufficient, for example to restrict firms' choices to production plans that generate positive intermediate endowments.
11 For such production plans, the main theorem in ? implies that (⋅) is not empty-valued. However, positivity of intermediate endowments is not necessary for the existence of a Walrasian equilibrium in the associated pureexchange economy and therefore a much larger set than the one described above 11 This happens, for example, if each production set is contained in the set { ∈ ℝ | ≥ − min ∈ℐ , ∀ = 1, . . . , }, where is the upper bound on the kernels .
may still generate non-empty values for . For the remaining of the paper we are going to abstract from the difficulties posed by the possible empty-values of by assuming that the production sets ( ) ∈ contain some capacity constraints that are tight enough to guarantee the existence of a competitive equilibrium for every production plan . 12 Thus, the production sets ( ) ∈ are assumed to be compact.
13
Since the correspondence is closed, has compact values, 14 and it is defined on a compact space, 15 is weakly measurable and thus, according to Kuratowski-Ryll-Nardzewski theorem (?, Theorem 18.13), it has a measurable selection p (i.e., p is measurable and p( ) ∈ ( )).
A pair (¯ ,¯ ) of prices¯ ∈ Δ −1 and production plan¯ is a Walrasian equilibrium for the economy ℰ if and only if¯ ∈ (¯ ) and, for -almost every ∈ Ω ,¯ ⋅¯ ( ) = max
We introduce next the concept of a Cournot -equilibrium, which captures the idea that, although an individual consumer cannot affect market prices through his consumption decisions, he is aware of the effect that a firm that he owns has on market prices.
Definition 4.1. A production plan * is called -efficient for firm = ( , ), given the measurable price selection p from if and only if there does not exist ∈ such that:
where˜ : Ω → ℝ is defined as˜ := * +( − * )1 ( ) and 1 ( ) is the indicator function of the set ( ). A pair (p, * ) consisting of a measurable selection p from and a production plan * is called a Cournot -equilibrium if, given the selection p, * is -efficient for -almost every ∈ Ω .
We will simply refer to a production plan * as being a Cournot -equilibrium whenever there exists a measurable price selection p such that (p, * ) is a 12 One can dispense of this assumption by restricting the firms' strategy sets to a subset on which existence of a competitive equilibrium is guaranteed. With due care, all the results of this paper can be derived under such restriction, but the details of the construction are beyond the scope of this paper.
13 It is well-known that boundedness of the production sets is a necessary condition for obtaining competitive behavior in large economies. Otherwise a firm could increase its scale as the economy grows larger and still be a dominant part of the aggregate production (see the discussion and additional references in ?). Nevertheless, as we show in this paper, boundedness of the production plans is not sufficient to achieve competitive behavior in large economies: the ownership structure plays a crucial role towards that end.
14 The standard reference is ?. However, in our case an extension of the classical result is needed since the intermediate endowments may generate zero wealth (see, for example, ?).
15 Note that intermediate endowments must lie in a compact subset of ℝ , since the set of feasible production plans is bounded. The space of laws on ℝ with support in a given compact is compact, when endowed with the weak convergence topology (?, Theorem 9.3.3).
Cournot -equilibrium. Thus for a fixed price selection, a production plan is -efficient for a firm if, given the choices of the other firms, there does not exist another production plan such that every shareholder of the firm is better off in the new market equilibrium. -efficiency requires thus the firm to obey a unanimous vote of its shareholders and therefore it represents a minimal condition on preference aggregation. This makes -efficiency a very weak condition, since different production choices made by a firm may generate equilibrium allocations for that firm's shareholders which are not Pareto comparable. It is therefore likely that the set of Cournot -equilibria is large. Our example 5.2 in Section 5 supports this hypothesis. Note however that having such a permissive equilibrium concept only strengthens our main results. Convergence to Walrasian equilibria, as stated in Theorem 5.6 for example, still holds when firms follow a different objective that selects a strict subset of the -efficient outcomes. Moreover, failure to converge to a Walrasian equilibrium outcome is not driven by the existence of a large set of -efficient outcomes either. This is illustrated by the diffuse ownership example of Section 2, in which the Cournot -efficient equilibrium is unique. We examine first the relationship between Walrasian equilibria and Cournot -equilibria in atomless economies. We start by showing that a measure zero of firms cannot affect the equilibrium price. Since every single firm (atom) is of measure zero in an atomless economy, an individual firm's change in production has a negligible price effect. Proof. Since ({ ∕ = ′ }) = 0, for any set ∈ ℱ of consumers, (3.3) implies
Thus the intermediate endowments associated to the two production plans coincide -a.e., and therefore ( ) = ( ′ ).
In atomless economies, a Walrasian equilibrium is also a Cournot -equilibrium, but the choice of an -efficient production plan may not necessarily lead to profit maximization (at the Walrasian prices) for some ownership structures. 1. If (¯ ,¯ ) is a Walrasian equilibrium for ℰ, then (p,¯ ) is a Cournotequilibrium for ℰ, wherep is any price selection such thatp(¯ ) =¯ .
2. If (p,¯ ) is a Cournot -equilibrium for ℰ, then¯ is profit maximizing at pricesp(¯ ) on the set of firms Ω defined by
is a Cournot -equilibrium, for any production plan .
Proof. 1. By Lemma 4.2, any deviation from¯ by a single firm will leave the price¯ unchanged. Hence, given the absence of price effects, the best choice of a production plan for each firm, from the perspective of its shareholders, is a profit maximizing plan.
2. Let¯ :=p(¯ ). Using Lemma 4.2 and Definition 4.1, it follows that (p,¯ ) is a Cournot -equilibrium if and only if for every firm , the set of its shareholders whose wealth can be increased by a deviation to a profit maximization choice is negligible. Formally, for anyˆ which is a profit maximizing at prices¯ ,
Condition (4.4) requires that for -a.e. ∈ Ω , either¯ ⋅ˆ ( ) =¯ ⋅¯ ( ) or ( , { | ( , ( )) > 0}) = 0 (or both), and the conclusion follows.
The last part of the proposition points out that, in an atomless economy, any production plan is -efficient for firms in Ω ∖Ω (ℰ). Note that a firm belongs to the set Ω (ℰ) if it satisfies two conditions. One is to have some shareholders whose portfolios are not fully diversified (in the sense of having a positive mass of their total share holdings invested in the firm and thus being affected significantly by that firm's profits). The second requirement is that the set of those non fully-diversified shareholders own (jointly) a positive fraction of the firm. These two conditions insure that the firm's choices have a non-negligible effect on the wealth of a group of its shareholders owning a positive fraction of the firm. Because the price effect is absent in an atomless economy, those shareholders unanimously approve profit maximization and thus any Cournot -efficient production plan for a given firm has to be profit maximizing. Note that Ω (ℰ) = ∅ if the measures ( , ⋅) are atomless for every ∈ Ω . This happens, for instance, in the diffuse ownership economy ℰ introduced in (3.9). At the other extreme lies the concentrated ownership economy ℰ defined in (3.8), where Ω (ℰ ) = Ω and thus every Cournot -equilibrium is profit maximizing.
Limit behavior of Cournot -equilibrium
We investigate the behavior of Cournot -equilibrium in large economies and establish under what conditions Cournot-S equilibrium production plans in a sequence of convergent economies approach profit maximizing production plans of the limit economy. To avoid repetition, throughout this section we will refer to a sequence of economies (ℰ = ((Ω , ℱ , ); (Ω , ); )) ∈ℕ simply as (ℰ ), and to a limit economy ℰ = ((Ω , ℱ, ); (Ω , ); ) as ℰ. We use the notation := , := (see (3.2)). For any sequence of economies (ℰ ), we assume that there exists¯ > 0 such that ( , Ω ) ≤¯ , for all ∈ Ω and ∈ ℕ.
We prove first that a firm's choice of production plans bounded away from profit maximization in increasingly large economies is detrimental to a shareholder owning a fraction of a firm bounded away from zero.
Lemma 5.1. Consider a sequence of economies (ℰ ) and for each ∈ ℕ, let be a production plan in ℰ and ∈ ( ) be a pure exchange equilibrium of ℰ ( ). Assume that (⋅) is a singleton at any adherent point of the sequence of intermediate endowment distributions induced by ( ).
16 Let¯ ∈ Ω be a firm such that ( (¯ )) → 0. For each , letˆ be another production plan differing from only in the choice of firm¯ , and letˆ ∈ (ˆ ) be an equilibrium of ℰ (ˆ ). Assume that there exists > 0 such thatˆ ˆ (¯ ) > (¯ )+ for all . Then for each > 0 there exists ′ > 0 and ∈ ℕ such that for all consumers ∈ Ω whose holdings in firm¯ are bounded below by in all economies (ℰ ),
Proof. Suppose the conclusion is not true. Then there exists > 0 and ∈ ℐ, such that for every ∈ ℕ there exists ∈ Ω and ∈ ℕ such that ( ) = , (¯ , (¯ )) ≥ and
Since production plans take value in a compact and the kernels ( ) are uniformly bounded from above, intermediate endowments also lie in a compact. Therefore, on a subsequence, (¯ ) → ∈ ℝ, ˆ (¯ ) →ˆ ∈ ℝ, and ∘˜ −1 converges weakly to some distribution , since the sequence of distributions of intermediate endowments ( the Euclidean norm in ℝ , we have
By the definition of intermediate endowments (4.1) and by (3.3),
As ( (¯ )) → 0 and production plans belong to a compact, there exists 2 ∈ ℕ such that
and given that was arbitrary, we obtained the desired convergence of ∘˜ −1
to . Since (⋅) has closed graph and is a singleton at , then (along a subsequence)
,ˆ → , with { } = ( ). Taking limits as → ∞ in (5.2) and using the continuity of the indirect utility , it follows that ( ,ˆ ) ≤ ( , ) and thus ⋅ˆ ≤ ⋅ . However, (4.1) gives
and taking the limit with → ∞, we get ⋅ˆ ≥ ⋅ + ⋅ . Hence a contradiction is obtained and the conclusion follows.
Lemma 5.1 establishes the main result of ? in our complete markets environment using an alternative, simpler proof, which does not require the "assumption that all consumers are typical" (his Assumption 8).
17 We illustrate below the restrictiveness of this condition imposed on the endogenous wealth distributions of the agents induced by a sequence of production plans.
Example 5.1
We modify slightly the example of section 2, by removing the consumer that does not own shares in the prototype economy, and letting the endowments of the unique agent of the prototype economy be (2, 2). Assume that in the finite -fold replica ℰ , first firm is entirely owned by the first consumer, while the ownership of the other firms is distributed uniformly across the remaining consumers. This is exactly the example used by ? to outline his results for the case with no uncertainty (the number of states of nature equals one).
Given a production plan = ((− , )) =1 in the -fold replica ℰ , the resulting exchange equilibrium price vector, normalized to the unit simplex, is unique and depends only on the average production,
with ( ) defined as in (2.1). Consider a sequence of production plans ( ) associated to the replicas (ℰ ). In the economy ℰ , the wealth ( ) of all agents > 1 coincide. Fix an > 1. Therefore the wealth distribution of agents in ℰ is given by
which converges to lim ( ) whenever the average ( ) of converges.
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The proof of ? Theorem 1 rests on the assumption that "all consumers are typical" (Assumption 8), which in this context requires that if lim ( ) exists, then lim (1) exists and equals lim ( ). Of course this is an extremely strong assumption which reduces the applicability of his theorem. In this example, it applies only to a sequence of production plans ( ) with the property that on each subsequence where ( ) converges (that is, the average production converges), the profit of the first firm ( ) (1) converges to the same limit as the average profit ( ) ∑ =1 ( )/ . With the numerical values here, this happens only if the production of the first firm converges to the limit of the average production, or the average production converges to zero.
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We show next that Cournot -efficient production plans become arbitrarily close to profit maximization in large economies for firms having all their shareholders owning a fraction of the firm bounded away from zero. For finite economies (ℰ ) ∈ℕ , denote the set of firms that have only non-diversified 
By contrast, our version of ? result given in Lemma 5.1 holds without requiring that the production plan of firm 1 converges to the limit of the average production plans on subsequences where the latter exists. For every ∈ ℕ consider a production planˆ in ℰ that differs from only in the choice of firm¯ . Then for every > 0 there exists
Proof. Suppose, by contradiction, that the conclusion is false. Then there exists > 0 such that (along a subsequence) (¯ )+ <ˆ ˆ (¯ ), where := p ( ) andˆ := p (ˆ ). Lemma 5.1 contradicts the Cournot -efficiency of the plans ( ) for all large .
Next we define a convergence notion on the space of private ownership economies, not restricted to replica economies (introduced at the end of section 3), and characterize the production plans of a limit economy that are the limit of a sequence of Cournot -efficient equilibria of converging economies. ⊂ for all and for -a.e. ∈ Ω , ( ( )) → ( ( )),
(ii) The ownership kernels converge to , in the sense that for each uniformly bounded sequence 20 ( ) of random variables on Ω such that is -measurable for all and, for -a.e. ∈ Ω , → ( , ⋅)-a.s., the following holds
(iii) has an extension to ℱ that converges setwise to .
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Condition (i) requires the "size" of each firm along the sequence to approach the size of the firm in the limit. It is always satisfied if ( ) is increasing ( ⊂ +1 for all ∈ ℕ) and asymptotically generates ( = (∪ ∈ℕ )), requirements expressed by the notation ↗ . Condition (ii) indicates that the ownership kernels in the finite economies "approach" the limit ownership 20 The sequence ( ), with : Ω → ℝ, is uniformly bounded if sup | | < for some ∈ ℝ. 21 This means that there exist measures˜ (⋅) on ℱ which coincide with when restricted to ℱ (i.e.,˜ (⋅)| ℱ = (⋅)), and˜ ( ) → ( ) for all ∈ ℱ . Lemma C.1 gives sufficient conditions for the existence of such extensions. structure described by the kernel . It is satisfied if, for example, ↗ and for -almost all ∈ Ω , the kernel ( , ⋅) has an extension to that converges setwise to ( , ⋅) (Lemma C.2). Sufficient conditions for the existence of such an extension are given in Lemma C.1. In this case, for almost all consumers, the number of shares they own in a group of firms in each finite economy converges to the number of shares held in the respective set of firms in the limit economy, which makes the "closeness" notion between and embedded in condition (ii) intuitive. In particular, for the concentrated and diffuse ownership replica economies discussed in Section 3, the kernels , defined in (3.5),(3.7) have extensions to , equal to , , and hence they trivially converge setwise. Finally, condition (iii) in conjunction with condition (ii) guarantees that the distribution of intermediate endowments of the finite economies converges to the distribution of intermediate endowments in the limit economy (Proposition 5.5). It simply means that the relative size of a set of consumers in each finite economy approaches its size in the limit economy.
The convergence notion for finite economies introduced in Definition 5.3 is flexible enough to allow any economy to be approximated by finite economies. The idea is to construct the ownership kernel of a finite economy as a "conditional expectation" of the ownership kernel in the limit economy, by averaging out the ownership structures of consumers belonging to the same atom of the finite economy. In particular the kernels , (see (3.5),(3.7)) have this property. Indeed, for any ∈ 2 ⊗ ℋ , ∈ Ω and ∈ { , },
Proposition 5.4. Consider an economy ℰ = ((Ω , ℱ, ); (Ω , ); ) with (Ω , ) Polish space, and let (ℱ ) ∈ℕ , respectively ( ) ∈ℕ , be finite -algebras on Ω , respectively Ω , such that ℱ ↗ ℱ and ↗ . There exists a sequence of finite economies (ℰ ) ∈ℕ with ℰ = ((Ω , ℱ , ); (Ω , ); )), converging to ℰ and satisfying
Proof. Consider the probability space (Ω × Ω , ℱ ⊗ , Θ), with Θ := ⊗ / ), where ⊗ is defined in (2.1) and := ( ⊗ )(Ω ⊗ Ω ). Let , respectively be the projections of (Ω × Ω , ℱ ⊗ ) on (Ω , ), respectively on (Ω , ℱ ). ? guarantees the existence of a regular conditional distribution of given , denoted by . 22 Thus is a probability kernel from (Ω , ℱ ) to (Ω , ), such that for all ∈ , ( , ) = (1 ∈ | ) = (1 Ω × | ). For all ∈ Ω and ∈ , let
By construction is a kernel from (Ω , ℱ ) to (Ω , ). Notice that for any 22 In Appendix B, we constructed in an identical fashion the kernel as a regular conditional distribution of given .
∈ ℱ and ∈ ,
The first equality uses the ℱ measurability of in the first argument, and the law of standard expectations. The rest use equation (3.3) and the properties of the conditional distribution . Therefore satisfies (5.6). Consider a sequence of random variables ( ) with : Ω → ℝ being -measurable, and let , : Ω → ℝ, -measurable, such that | | ≤ , ∫ Ω < ∞ and → , -a.s. Starting with simple functions and then extending the argument using a monotone class theorem (?, Theorem 1.1), it follows that
By Lebesgue's dominated convergence theorem, the sequence of functions (
Using an extension of the martingale convergence theorem due to Hunt (?, Theorem 2.8.5), it follows that → , -a.s. Thus we proved that indeed converges to in the sense of Definition 5.3.
By the martingale convergence theorem, (5.6) implies that for each ∈ , (⋅, ) → (⋅, ), -a.e. However the set of -measure zero where the convergence might fail depends on , hence the set of where ( , ) does not converge to ( , ) for some ∈ might be large. Thus it might not be true that, for -a.e. ∈ Ω , ( , ⋅) converges setwise to ( , ⋅). All that is guaranteed is that for -a.e. ∈ Ω , ( , ) → ( , ), for all ∈ ∪ , since ∪ is countable. Therefore Proposition 5.4 shows that condition (ii) in the Definition 5.3 is satisfied by a large class of sequences of economies and corresponding limit economies, which might not be the case if we were to replace it with the stronger requirement of having extensions to converging setwise to .
For a general sequence of convergent economies as in Definition 5.3 and a sequence of convergent production plans, we show that agents' intermediate endowments converge almost surely (with respect to the measure of agents in the limit economy) and the distribution of intermediate endowments across types converges weakly.
Proposition 5.5. Let (ℰ ) be a sequence of finite economies converging to an economy ℰ. Let be a production plan in ℰ and, for every ∈ ℕ, let be a production plan in ℰ . If → , -a.s., where = , then converges to -a.s. and ∘˜ −1 converges weakly to ∘˜ −1 .
Proof. Using equation (3.3), for any ∈ ℬ(Ω ), with ( ) = 0 it follows that ( , ) = 0 for -a.e. ∈ Ω . Thus the fact that → -a.s. implies that, for -a.e. ∈ Ω , → , ( , ⋅)-a.s. Since converges to , it follows that → , -a.s. (see Definition 5.3,(ii)). For any : ℐ × ℝ → ℝ continuous and bounded, Lemma C.2 applied to the sequence having extensions converging setwise to gives
(5.8) Thus the convergence of the distribution of intermediate endowments across types is established.
The following theorem shows that converging Cournot -equilibrium production plans become profit maximizing in the limit for all the firms having only non-diversified shareholders.
Theorem 5.6. Let (ℰ ) be a sequence of finite economies converging to ℰ, assumed atomless, and for each ∈ ℕ, let be a Cournot -equilibrium of the economy ℰ , such that → in -measure. Assume that there exists a unique equilibrium price associated with the production plan in the limit economy ℰ (that is ( ) is a singleton). Then is profit maximizing at prices for -almost all firms belonging to Ω ((ℰ )).
Proof. Assume, by contradiction, that is not profit maximizing for a -positive measure of firms belonging to Ω ((ℰ )). Let¯ be a profit maximizing production plan at price , such that firms of the same type have identical production plans, that is,¯ is selected to be 2 × [0, 1]-measurable and satisfies:
Notice that¯ is also -measurable, for any ∈ ℕ. The boundedness of the production sets implies that¯ is bounded as well. Construct the -measurable function : Ω → ℝ defined as (⋅) := ⋅¯ (⋅) − ⋅ (⋅) ≥ 0 and, for all , let : Ω → ℝ, (⋅) := ⋅¯ (⋅) − ⋅ (⋅) ≥ 0, which is -measurable. Along a subsequence, → -a.s., since any sequence convergent in measure has a subsequence converging almost surely (?, Theorem 9.2.1). Thus there exists a set ∈ with ( ) > 0 such that
Let¯ ∈ . As → on the set of full -measure where → , there exists > 0 and ∈ ℕ such that
As¯ ∈ Ω ((ℰ )), along a subsequence, ( (¯ )) > 0 for all and there exists > 0 such that ( , (¯ )) ≥ , for (¯ , ⋅)-a.e. and for all .
(5.10)
Define the alternative production planŝ = + (¯ − )1 (¯ ) .
Since the limit economy is atomless, ( (¯ )) → ( (¯ )) = 0. This implies thatˆ converges in measure to , and hence it converges almost surely to along a subsequence. Consider a price selection p associated to such that (p , ) is Cournot -equilibrium for ℰ . Let = p ( ) andˆ = p (ˆ ). By Proposition 5.5,
, it follows that, for any convergent subsequence (ˆ ) of (ˆ ),
By repeating the reasoning for ( ) , it follows that on a subsequence, ,ˆ → . Equation (5.9) implies that for each ∈ ℕ,
Since all production plans belong to a compact, it follows that there exists > 0 and ( ) ≥ , such that for all ≥ ( ),
which, by Lemma 5.1 and equation (5.10), contradicts the Cournot -efficiency of the production plans , for all large .
The theorem relies heavily on the assumption that there is a unique equilibrium price corresponding to the limit production plan in the atomless economy. This condition is needed to insure continuity of the price selection at the limit point. While we cannot dispense with it completely, the requirement can be considerably relaxed, with a construction as in ?. That approach allows for multiplicity of equilibria at the limit point, but requires regularity of the limit equilibrium and thus its local uniqueness. Even so, it remains a strong condition since, as shown by Roberts himself, existence of critical equilibria is non-pathological.
? pointed out that this negative result is alleviated if, instead of simple price selections, one uses randomized price selections (i.e., selections from the correspondence instead of ; this amounts to saying that firms hold nontrivial beliefs over the possible market clearing prices). As opposed to the case of simple price selections, the existence of continuous randomized price selections is a generic result (?). Allen proves therefore that, if firms maximize their expected profits with respect to some non-trivial beliefs over prices, convergence of Cournot equilibria (in which firms maximize profits) to competitive equilibria does obtain generically. However, the problem is more complex here and Allen's approach cannot be directly applied. The reason is that, as opposed to the standard Cournot model in which the firms maximize profits, in our modelefficiency requires firms to make pairwise comparisons between a status quo and an alternative. For that, a firm has to use its beliefs over two different equilibrium sets. To make this comparison meaningful, some global beliefs need to be defined. This was done in ?. Whether allowing for firms' non-trivial global beliefs over prices does indeed improve the convergence result is an interesting question which remains open for now and will be subject of future research.
For the diffuse ownership economies (ℰ ) defined in (3.6),(3.7), Ω ((ℰ )) = ∅, and Theorem 5.6 is devoid of implications. For the concentrated ownership case described in (3.4),(3.5), Ω ((ℰ )) = Ω and thus the limit of Cournot -efficient equilibria is always a Walrasian equilibrium. Moreover, for this particular case, Theorem 5.6 holds even under the weaker assumption that production plans converge weakly (i.e., in distribution). This was shown by ?, using the fact that in this symmetric environment, the distribution of intermediate endowments associated to a production plan depends solely on the distribution of the production plan (both in the finite and continuum economies), and retracing the steps in the proof of Theorem 5.6. For completeness, we give an alternative proof of this result here, by showing that it follows from Theorem 5.6, through a Skorohod embedding argument. For a production plan :
we let ℒ( ) be the distribution of ( (1, ⋅) , . . . , ( , ⋅)) : [0, 1] → (ℝ ) and refer to it as the law of . Thus ℒ( ) := ∘ ( (1, ⋅) , . . . , ( , ⋅)) −1 .
Theorem 5.7. Let be a production plan in ℰ and for each ∈ ℕ, let be a Cournot -equilibrium of the concentrated ownership economy ℰ , such that the laws of ( ) converge weakly to the law of . Assume that there exists a unique equilibrium price associated with the production plan in the limit economy ℰ (i.e. ( ) is a singleton). Then is profit maximizing at prices .
Proof. By Skorohod's embedding theorem (?, Theorem 4.30), there are alternative production plansˆ and (ˆ ), defined on (
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Since is atomless, by Lyapunov's convexity theorem (?, Theorem 13.33) we can construct disjoint sets 1 , . . . , ⊂ [0, 1] such that = ∪ =1 and ( ) = 1/ for all ∈ {1, . . . , }. Repeating this process for each ∈ ( × [0, 1]), we construct for each ∈ the partition 1 , . . . , of [0, 1] with ( ) = 1/ and ( × ) = ( × ) for all ∈ {1, . . . , }, ∈ . Thusˆ is measurable with respect to the algebraˆ :
23 As defined in section 3,
Construct the economyÊ := ((Ω , ℱ , ℐ ⊗ ), (Ω ,ˆ ),ˆ ), in which each consumer ( , ) owns a share of the firm × . Thuŝ
Notice thatˆ is a Cournot -efficient production plan forÊ . Otherwise, a welfare improving deviation for the shareholders of firm × in economyÊ would be welfare improving for the shareholders of firm × in economy ℰ , contradicting the Cournot -efficiency of the plan .
The intermediate endowment of an agent ( , ⋅) given a production plan ′ in either of the economies
in ( Convergence in distribution of production plans is too weak for Theorem 5.6, in which we allow for heterogeneity in the ownership of firms and consumers of identical type. Given an arbitrary production plan, one can permute the choices of identical type firms, resulting in two production plans with identical distributions; however, in the presence of asymmetric ownership the two plans induce different distributions over the space of intermediate endowments.
Given a sequence of economies (ℰ ) converging to an economy ℰ, as in Theorem 5.6, it is natural to ask what is the relationship between the set Ω (ℰ) (see (4.3)) of firms that are profit maximizing in any Cournot -efficient equilibrium of the atomless limit economy, and the set Ω ((ℰ )) of firms that are profit maximizing in the limit of a convergent sequence of Cournotefficient equilibria. We already remarked that for the diffuse ownership case (see (3.6),(3.7)), Ω (ℰ ) = Ω ((ℰ )) = ∅, while for the concentrated ownership case (see (3.4),(3.5)), Ω (ℰ ) = Ω ((ℰ )) = Ω . Example 5.2 below constructs economies ℰ → ℰ where Ω ((ℰ )) = ∅, while Ω (ℰ) = Ω . In fact, in all the examples included in the paper, Ω ((ℰ ) ∈ℕ ) ⊂ Ω (ℰ), since the kernels ( ) denoting the distribution of firms' shares across consumers in (ℰ ) have (for all ∈ Ω ) extensions to ℱ converging setwise to the kernel associated to ℰ.
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The examples may also lead us to conjecture that a sequence of Cournot -equilibria of a converging sequence of finite economies approaches a Cournot -efficient equilibrium of the limit economy. If true, this property would imply, according to Proposition 4.3, that convergent sequences of Cournot -equilibria of converging finite economies approach a profit maximizing plan of the limit economy for firms in Ω (ℰ). The following example shows that the conjecture is not true and thus sequences of Cournot -equilibria do not necessarily converge to a Cournot -equilibrium of the limit economy. Example 5.2 We modify the ownership structures in the Example 5.1. In the finite -fold replica ℰ and in the continuum replica ℰ ∞ , half of each firm is owned exclusively by the agent with the same name and the rest is uniformly distributed across all agents (including the agent with the same name). We will refer to this way of assigning ownership of the firms in the replicas as the hybrid ownership structure.
Given a production plan = ((− , )) =1 in the -fold replica ℰ , the unique exchange equilibrium price vector, normalized to the unit simplex, is given by (5.4), with ( ) defined as in (2.1). For the continuum replica, prices have the same expression, with ( ) defined in (2.2). The Walrasian equilibrium in the finite and continuum replica economies are associated with prices ( We start by determining the Cournot -efficient production plans in thefold replica economy. The wealth of a consumer that is a majority shareholder in a firm choosing (− , ) is
and its utility is ( ( ), ) = 2 ln ( ( ), )−ln (2 1 )−ln (2 2 ). We let := ( ) for brevity. Notice that 11) and it follows that the derivative of with respect to is negative:
Thus a firm that chooses (− , ) hurts its majority shareholder by switching to a production plan ( ′ , ′ ) with ′ > . Moreover, (5.11) shows that by switching to a production plan ( ′ , ′ ) with ′ < , the firm hurts a minority
(along a subsequence), by Definition 5.3, (ii), it follows that (⋅, (¯ )) → (⋅, (¯ )), -a.s., and hence 1 (⋅, (¯ ))≥ → 1 (⋅, (¯ ))≥ ( -a.s.). By Lemma C.2, we conclude that (¯ ,
shareholder that owns half of a firm that chose a production plan (− , ) satisfying ( − ) 3 ≥ 4 . This discussion enables us to construct a multitude of Cournot -equilibria. In particular, for any ∈ {1, 2, . . . , − 1}, a production plan with firms choosing (0, 0) and − firms choosing (−1, 1) is always a Cournot -equilibrium.
The economies (ℰ ) and ℰ ∞ can be embedded in the general framework of section 3 as discussed there, by letting = /2 + /2 and = /2 + /2 (see (3.4)-(3.9)). Notice that for the limit economy, Ω (ℰ ∞ ) = Ω = [0, 1] (since ℐ = = {1}, we identify {1} × [0, 1] with [0, 1]) and thus by Proposition 4.3, the only Cournot -equilibrium allocation of the continuum economy ℰ ∞ coincides with the Walrasian equilibrium and corresponds to all firms choosing (0, 0). This can be seen directly, also, since in the absence of price effects, any firm that chose (− , ) with > 0 will increase the wealth and hence the utility of its majority shareholder by switching to (0, 0), while its minority shareholders are unaffected.
Notice that for any > 0 and ∈ ℕ, Ω ((ℰ )) = ∅, hence Theorem 5.6 has no bite in this example, suggesting that a sequence of Cournot -equilibrium plans does not converge necessarily to a profit maximization plan. Indeed, for an arbitrary ∈ [0, 1], consider the production plan in the limit economy in which firms in [0, ] choose the production plan (−1, 1) and the firms in ( is not a profit maximizing plan unless = 0. This shows that a convergent sequence of Cournot -equilibrium production plans in converging economies does not have to approach a Cournot -equilibrium in the limit.
Conclusions
This paper contributes to the literature on non-cooperative foundations of Walrasian equilibrium, by pointing out to the firms' ownership structure as a potential source of inefficiency in arbitrarily large economies. If (some) shareholders control a firm's production decisions, its objective is shaped by the interaction between the price and the income effects on those shareholders' welfare. Each of these effects, and therefore the dominance of one over the other, depends on the ownership structure.
The Cournotian foundations of Walrasian equilibrium require the introduction of a notion of finite economies being close (converging) to a continuum economy. As explained in the introduction, this is difficult to achieve when one needs to allow for arbitrary ownership structures (whose role needs to be explored). The paper contributes to the literature by defining a suitable topology on the space of production economies, which generalizes previous results and allows for full generality on the ownership structure. We give conditions on the ownership structures of a sequence of economies, and of a limit economy, such that agents' intermediate endowments generated by a converging sequence of production plans approach the intermediate endowments of the limit economy. We focus on the large economies behavior of Cournot -efficient equilibria, in which firms choose production plans that are not Pareto dominated from the point of view of their shareholders. The classical result of ? indicates that profit maximization (under a specific price normalization) is a justified objective for an oligopolistic firm in a large economy, since gains obtained by deviating to shareholders' welfare improving plans are modest. We derive this result in our framework removing the very restrictive assumption "that agents are typical" used by ? and imposed on the agents' wealth (which is an endogenous variable). We then use this result to show that if each of the (controlling) shareholders of a firm owns a significant (i.e., bounded away from zero) fraction of the firm, then Cournot -efficient equilibria of large economies consists of production plans that are approximatively profit maximizing. Moreover, Cournot -equilibria of a converging sequence of finite economies approaches a Walrasian equilibrium of the limit economy. For arbitrary ownership structures, sequences of Cournotefficient equilibria may not converge to a Walrasian equilibrium or to a Cournot -equilibrium of the limit economy.
Although we do not model trade in shares, we do allow for arbitrary (fixed) distributions of shares in each finite economy along the converging sequence and identify the class of those ownership structures that are conducive to competitive behavior. Our results bear implications even for richer environments in which share trading is allowed. It shows, for example, that perfectly competitive behavior will prevail in any large economy model of security trade in which the (post-trade) equilibrium distribution of shares is concentrated. On the other hand, perfect diversification of individual portfolios across firms (as predicted, for example, by mean-variance portfolio selection models) might lead to inefficiencies. all sets obtainable from finite sequences of set theoretic operations on . Thus is also countable. Fix a point ∈ , and let¯ ( ) := ∩{ ∈¯ | ∈ }. Define := { ∈ | / ∈ } ∪ { ∈ | ∈ ,¯ ( ) ⊂ }.
It is easy to check that is a -system, which means that it contains Ω and is closed under proper differences and increasing limits. Moreover¯ ⊂ , and is a −system (i.e. is closed under finite intersections). The monotone class theorem (?, Th. 1.1) implies that = (¯ ) ⊂ ⊂ , and thus = . It follows that¯ ( ) = ( ), but¯ ( ) ∈ since¯ is countable.
B Construction of the -kernel
Let := ( ⊗ )(Ω × Ω ). The assumptions made guarantee that 0 < < ∞ and thus we can write ⊗ = ⋅ Θ, with Θ a probability on ℱ ⊗ . Define , to be the projection functions of (Ω × Ω , ℱ ⊗ ) on (Ω , ℱ), respectively on (Ω , ). Since (Ω , ℱ) is a Polish space, there exists a regular conditional distribution of given , which is probability kernel from (Ω , ) to (Ω , ℱ) (?, ?). The kernel is is unique -a.s., in the sense that if ′ has the above properties, then for -a.e. ∈ Ω , ( , ⋅) = ′ ( , ⋅). Let Θ be the marginal of Θ on Ω . By construction, and using the fact that ⊗ = ⋅ Θ, it follows that for any : Ω × Ω → ℝ, which is ℱ ⊗ -measurable and ⊗ -integrable,
and hence we obtained equation (3.3).
C Setwise convergence of measures on a filtration
For all ∈ ℕ, let be a measure on (Ω, ) where is finite and ↗ (i.e. ⊂ +1 and = (∪ )), and let be a finite measure on (Ω, ). The next result provides sufficient conditions for the existence of extensions (˜ ) of the measures ( ) to that converge setwise to . This means that, for all ∈ ℕ, the restriction of˜ to coincides with (i.e.˜ | = ) and ˜ ( ) → ( ) for all ∈ . Notice that if such extensions (˜ ) are to exist, then for any and ∈ , lim →∞ ( ) = ( ). It turns out that this condition is also sufficient, in the presence of a uniform boundedness condition imposed on ( ).
Lemma C.1. Assume that (i) For any ∈ ℕ and ∈ , lim →∞ ( ) = ( ),
(ii) There exists > 0 such that ≤ ⋅ for all ∈ ℕ, that is,
Then ( ) have extensions to that converge setwise to .
Proof. For all , label the atoms of as 1 , 2 , . . . , ( ) . Definẽ
Thus˜ is constructed by summing the measures obtained as the conditionals of with respect to each atom of , scaled so that the measure of each atom of coincides under˜ and . Clearly˜ is a measure on which is equal to when restricted to . Define := { ∈ |˜ ( ) → ( )}.
Condition (i) implies that ∪ ⊂ . In particular, Ω ∈ . Moreover, is closed under proper differences, since if , ∈ with ⊂ , theñ ( ∖ ) =˜ ( ) −˜ ( ) → ( ) − ( ) = ( ∖ ).
We will show that is closed under increasing limits. Let 1 , 2 , . . . disjoint sets in . Notice that˜ (∪ ) = ∑ ˜ ( ), since˜ is a sum of a finite number of measures, and˜ ( ) ≤ ⋅ ( ), while ∑ ( ) = (∪ ) < ∞. Lebesgue's dominated convergence theorem implies
It follows that ∪ ∈ . We proved that is a -system containing the algebra ∪ which is a -system, being closed under finite intersections. The − theorem (?, Theorem 1.1) implies that = , and hence we proved that, indeed,˜ → setwise on .
If a sequence of measures (˜ ) on converges setwise to , then ˜ ( ) → ( ) for any bounded function : Ω → ℝ which is -measurable (?, p.335). This result is strengthened in the next Lemma. 
